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Introduction  
The field of global communication studies has yet to come to terms with changes 
in the global media environment that began with the advent of the Internet and 
accelerated with the rise of mobile devices, social networking media, and user-
generated content. These developments pose a radical challenge to the 
theoretical frameworks that have traditionally dominated international 
communication scholarship, if only because serious attempts to capture 
contemporary media dynamics require us to leave behind the meta-theoretical 
frameworks of modernization, dependency and globalization, and focus sharply 
on case-studies that yield insight about context-bound communication processes 
and their social and political implications. Indeed, we argue in this essay, 
whereas television was the default and often unstated fulcrum of much of global 
communication theory, the emergent global media environment is best 
understood as a transnational “hypermedia space” (see Kraidy, 2006) in which 
so-called “old” media like television and the newspaper join emergent media like 
mobile devices, social media, video on the Internet, and others to create a 
communication space the social and political implications of which we are only 
beginning to discern.  
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In this brief essay we purport to tease out some of the theoretical implications of 
the emergence of digital culture for global communication studies. To that end, 
we use the Middle East not as a “container” where we can capture distinct 
hypermedia dynamics, but rather as an optic on the changing nature of global 
communication in the digital age. It is our hope that the case studies we discuss 
hold insights applicable beyond the contemporary Middle East. Therefore it is our 
objective to point the discussion into a comparative direction with broad 
relevance to global communication studies. With that in mind, we first explicate 
the notion of hypermedia space, then we move forward to look at the role of 
hypermedia space in political upheaval in Lebanon in 2005 and Iran in 2009, and 
finally we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of these two 
cases for global communication studies. Before we describe and analyze the 
case-studies, let us clarify what we mean by hypermedia space. 
  
1. Defining Hypermedia Space 
Though the term hypermedia has been in use for a long time, we credit our use 
of the term to the Canadian international relations theorist Ronald Deibert (1997) 
who argues that the term “hypermedia”:  
… not only captures the convergence of discrete technologies, it also suggests 
the massive penetration and ubiquity of electronic media characteristic of the 
new communications environment … the prefix “hyper” (meaning “over” or 
“above”) emphasizes two central characteristics of that environment: the speed 
by which communications currently take place, and the intertextuality or 
interoperatibility of once-discrete media … linked together into a single seamless 
web of digital-electronic-telecommunications”(pp. 114-115). 
Though Deibert formulated his ideas on hypermedia before the advent of 
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, it is clear that these new developments 
reinforce the ease and fluidity with which digitized information moves between 
various media. Mobile telephony, tweets, email, social networks, text messaging, 
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digital cameras, online videos, electronic newspapers, and satellite television 
thus constitute a fluid communicative environment: hypermedia space. 
Clearly, the new media environment described in the preceding paragraph has 
implications for social and political communication. The advent of hypermedia 
space constitutes a qualitative leap in the ways that people seek, access, 
produce, and react to information. Most importantly, hypermedia space broadens 
access to the means of communication, since it is obviously easier for average 
people to “produce” messages today in the era of mobile devices and blogs than 
it was in the days of state-owned broadcasting, telephone landlines, and the daily 
newspaper delivered to the door or purchased at the store. The new media 
environment is therefore more participatory. As a result, since communication 
processes flow in several directions, and since the roles of producer and receiver 
of information have been scrambled, and since more people are now 
theoretically able to shape a message, then we can expect a multiplicity of 
discourses to arise in public culture.  
Since some of these discourses will have rival objectives, reflect competing 
agendas and carry conflicting ideologies, the new media environment fosters 
contention in the public sphere. Clearly, a variety of media “speaking” to each 
other do not and cannot alone trigger contentious political communication. 
However, when a context is rife with social and political tensions, and when 
social agents are willing and able to use hypermedia space with the objective of 
inducing change in the social or political status quo, then the availability of 
hypermedia space can play a crucial role in the performance of contention 
communication in public discourse. The cases of Lebanon in 2005 and Iran in 
2009 have the three elements mentioned above: (1) a socio-political context 
riddled with tensions, both internal to the Lebanese and Iranian polities, but also 
induced by foreign intervention and global geopolitics; (2) groups of people, 
mostly but not only students and young activists, agitating for systemic change, 
willing to take risks to reach that objective, and savvy with the use of hypermedia, 
and (3) the availability, even abundance, of mobile devices, digital cameras, 
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access to the Internet, and therefore to social networking (i.e. Facebook) and 
video (i.e. YouTube) sites and. Finally, as the case of Lebanon illustrates, 
popular culture—in this case reality television—can be recruited via hypermedia 
space for political ends. These developments, as our concluding section makes 
clear, have potentially profound implications for global communication studies. 
  
2. Lebanon’s Independence Intifada  
After a car bomb killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in Beirut, 
on February 14, 2005, television emerged as a crucial political forum. Hariri-
owned Future TV, hitherto known for is largely apolitical programming grid, 
became a full-time political machine, celebrating Hariri’s legacy, accusing the 
Syrian regime of having ordered the assassination, and keeping a focus on the 
UN investigation into Hariri’s murder. Future TV talk-shows featured many anti-
Syrian speakers while specially commissioned music videos asking for “The 
Truth” were repeatedly aired between programmes. LBC, politically sympathetic 
to Hariri’s political line, focused on the assassination only for a few days before 
returning to its regular programming mix of entertainment and news, avoiding the 
negative financial consequences of wall-to-wall coverage of the assassination. 
Whereas Future TV and LBC were critical of the Syrian regime and favorable to 
US and European intervention, two other leading Lebanese channels New TV 
known for its criticism of Hariri’s policies, and Hizbullah’s Al-Manar reflected a 
different view, one opposed to Western interference and suspicious of U.S. and 
Israeli agendas. Without explicitly supporting Syrian involvement in Lebanon, 
both channels refrained from criticizing the Syrian regime and both were critical 
of the UN investigation. New Television and al-Manar challenged Future TV LBC, 
with New Television propounding the secular version while Al-Manar put forth a 
religiously inflected version of events (Kraidy, 2009). 
As analyzed in-depth elsewhere (most of the discussion of the Lebanon case is 
drawn from Kraidy, 2009), the genre of programming known as “reality 
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television,” which features non-scripted amateur events and competitions whose 
outcome is determines by viewer voting via text-messages or through the 
Internet, was thoroughly politicized in the Middle East. With a production and 
dramatic logic that makes television shows dependent on other media, reality 
television programs can, under the right social circumstances, activate 
hypermedia space. Indeed, the assassination of Hariri triggered demonstrations 
in downtown Beirut, known as the “Independence Intifada,” that indicate that 
participatory activities called for by reality television programs like LBC’s Star 
Academy—voting by mobile phone, using text-messaging to build alliances and 
promote contestants, and in subsequent years, constructing Facebook fan 
pages, etc—can have real political applications.  
Indeed, in 2005 Beirut demonstrators used mobile phones, television and 
vocabulary from reality television programs in ways that suggests that the 
combination of hypermedia space and popular culture can have a powerful 
impact on public life. For example, demonstrators brandished signs using the 
language of reality television, as was clear in the large March 14, 2005, 
“opposition” demonstration clamoring for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon and the resignation of Lebanon’s pro-Syrian political and security 
leadership. Consider a hand-made, English-language sign carried by a 
demonstrator: the words “Lahoud Nominee” (referring to Lebanese President 
Emile Lahoud, whose term was illegitimately extended by Syrian fiat) sit atop the 
exhortation “call 1559” (in reference to the United Nations resolution calling for 
the withdrawal from Lebanon of Syrian troops and intelligence operatives). The 
sign replicates weekly reality television rituals with which a vast number of Arab 
viewers are familiar. It is therefore able to articulate a media-savvy political 
agenda in an age of attention scarcity, constituting attractive footage for the 
repetitive news cycle of Arab and Western news channels alike. 
Reality television was instrumentalized for politics not only on the street but also 
in television studios. On LBC, a Star Academy  rehearsal was interrupted live to 
announce Hariri’s death. Then LBC went into a week of mourning, following it 
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with a prime time Friday evening episode in which contestants hailing from 
throughout the Arab world sang patriotic Lebanese songs against the backdrop 
of a huge Lebanese flag, ultimately booting out the … Syrian contestant in an 
eerily politicized atmosphere. This event in the studio echoed the resignation of 
Omar Karamé, then Lebanon’s pro-Syrian prime minister, under pressure from 
demonstrators on the street. Clearly, US, French and Saudi support protected 
the Beirut demonstrations from direct repression, and media coverage played a 
crucial role in sustaining the rallies.  
Nonetheless, the demonstrators did not take external support for granted, but 
courted it aggressively, staging visually attractive spectacles and using English-
language signs. The demonstrators’ message of national unity was visually 
underscored by the omnipresence of the Lebanese national flag. Media and 
public relations professionals organized a human Lebanese flag made of 10,000 
people holding cardboard squares painted in white, green or red. The Beirut 
demonstrators took pictures with their mobile phones’ digital cameras and 
transmitted to bloggers who uploaded them on friendly websites and to 
mainstream  news media. The Hizbollah-organized rival demonstration was also 
festooned with Lebanese flags. The role of strategic communication experts 
notwithstanding, the demonstrations expressed genuine feelings of grief and 
popular anger at the system, and journalistic coverage was not entirely passive 
or acquiescent.  
A communicative chain of mobile phones, email and television was used 
effectively to create fluid and interactive communication processes that eluded 
control. Clearly, the actual use of hypermedia space depends on political context, 
availability of technology infrastructure, and most importantly, people willing to 
use various connected media for specific social or political purposes. When the 
Lebanese army established checkpoints around central Beirut to prevent 
demonstrators from reaching public spaces, soldiers at some checkpoints were 
clearly unwilling to use force to send demonstrators back on their tracks, a 
nugget of information that was immediately “blasted” via text messages, allowing 
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demonstra tors to converge on checkpoints where soldiers or commanding 
officers appeared sympathetic to their cause. At other checkpoints, young 
women put flowers in soldiers’ hands, thus “disarming” them and helping flows of 
men and women alerted via text-messaging  “blasts” to reach designated protest 
areas (Kraidy personal communications with demonstrators, June-August 2005). 
  
3. Iran’s Green Movement  
On June 20, 2009, a young Iranian woman was shot in the chest on a street in 
the Iranian capital Tehran during one of the post-election protests pitting 
students, activists and a newly visible political opposition to the forces of the 
Iranian regime. A witness captured the woman’s last moments on a mobile 
phone camera and uploaded the footage on YouTube. The 40-second video 
shows the young woman collapse on the pavement, a pool of blood spreading 
beneath her body, and blood coming out of her nose and mouth, her eyes open 
and staring at the camera. Two men kneel next to her, pressing on her chest. 
One of them is screaming out her name, Neda. The now viral video was picked 
up by social media such as Facebook as well as mainstream media 
organizations. The BBC and CNN were among the many stations that broadcast 
the video. The dying woman was identified as 26 year-old Neda Agha Soltan. 
Her killing occurred during one of the many demonstrations against the election 
to presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, accusing the president and the 
government of fraud and contesting election results. The Iranian government 
militia, Basij, was publicly accused of the murder of Neda and others who died 
during the protests (Fletcher, August 20, 2009; Press TV, June 29, 2009; 
Weaver, July 1, 2009). 
In November 2009, 5 months after the contested Iranian presidential elections, 
the British Broadcast ing Corporation released a documentary film titled “Neda: 
An Iranian Martyr.” In one camera shot, we see the mother of Neda kneeling 
beside her daughter’s grave. In the same frame we can also see her through the 
Kraidy & Mourad Lessons from the Middle East GMJ 
8 
mobile phone screens of two young women standing at the grave site and filming 
the scene (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v =C4-iLG6FwRc). The viewer can see 
BBC footage copied from a CNN camera capturing an image of mobile phone 
screens showing the image of Neda’s mourning mother. That all this can be seen 
in a YouTube video adds yet another layer to this inter-media configuration; it 
constitutes an additional node in the hypermedia chain that developed around 
Iran’s “Green Movement”  in 2009. 
Whereas Lebanon’s 2005 “Independence Intifada” saw the rise of text-
messaging as a political tool, Iran’s 2009 “Green Movement,” propelled Twitter 
onto the global consciousness through myriad news reports that depicted Twitter 
as a qualitatively different and radically effective tool in the contentious politics 
unfolding on the streets of Tehran. Neda was killed on a Saturday evening. By 
Sunday morning, she was the fifth most commented topic on Twitter (Putz, June 
22, 2009). By Monday, there were 6, 860 entries for her on the Persian language 
Google website (Fathi, June 23, 2009). At the time of writing, a Google search of 
‘Neda Agha Soltan’ yielded 1,680,000 results. A YouTube video showing her 
dying moments had 702,793 views. In post-elections Iran, mobile phones, 
emails, and social networking sites constitute the nodes of a hypermedia chain 
that turned stories, such as Neda’s death, into international events. Newspaper 
columnists and online journalists talked about a “Twitter Revolution,” of Twitter 
being the “medium of the movement” (Grossman, June 17, 2009) and a “player in 
Iran’s drama” (Musgrove, June 17, 2009), of Iranians “taking their protest online” 
(Nasr, June 14, 2009). 
In fact, as social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter saw a flood of news 
and images about the events unfolding in Iran, Twitter, a two-year old free social 
networking and micro-blogging service, became the primary source of 
information for many outside Iran, especially after the media blackout that 
followed the expulsion of foreign correspondents and the state detention of 
photographers, journalists and documentary filmmakers after the June elections [1] 
(Committee to Protect Journalists, July 30, 2009; CNN, June 16, 2009). The 
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Iranian government also restricted foreign media’s coverage by banning 
reporters from the streets and limiting them to work from their offices (Plunkett, 
June 16, 2009). Twitter thus emerged as a medium providing eyewitness 
accounts from street demonstrations when such accounts were hard to provide 
by journalists. Twitter enables its users to send and receive messages known as 
tweets that cannot exceed 140 characters. In their “About Us” section of their 
website, Twitter creators assert that “mobile has been in our DNA right from the 
start: The 140 character limit originated so tweets could be sent as mobile text 
messages which have a limit of 160 characters. Minus 20 characters for author 
attribution, this gives users just enough room” (http://www.twitter.com ). Twitter 
and mobile phones are then linked from the onset. The creators continue, 
“Twitter is the evolution of mobile messaging, not replacing SMS, IM, or email but 
introducing a new public dimension to messaging” (twitter.com, 2010). 
One of the main features of Twitter is the hashtag. As indicated in the name, this 
consists of placing the hash (#) sign in front of keywords. Hashtags were 
developed to create groupings on Twitter and make it easier to follow certain 
topics. They are “community -driven convention for adding context and metadata 
to your tweets” (Twitter Fan Wiki, http://twitter.pbworks.com/Hashtags ). 
According to the same website, hashtags were made famous during the San 
Diego forest fires in 2007 when blogger Nate Ritter used the hashtag 
"#sandiegofire" to identify his disaster-related updates. Twitter’s track feature and 
the development of the website hashtag.org made it possible to index and track 
the most discussed topics or “trends” and their frequency. Even non-Twitter 
users can subscribe to the RSS feed of their chosen hashtag, receive updates 
from twitter to their news reader of choice (Google Reader for example), and 
follow the conversation. The most popular hashtags created around the Iranian 
elections and the Green Movement are #Iran, #IranElection [2], #gr88 (a 
contraction of Green Revolution 1388, the Iranian calendar year in which the 
elections were held) and #Neda. This brings us back to the video of the slain 
young woman which, once captured on mobile phone, was made available on 
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YouTube and quickly picked up by twitterers who posted comments as well as 
links to the video and related pictures. But twitterers were not simple receivers as 
they made sure to create their own campaigns; one of which is the #CNNfail in 
response to the American news organization’s poor coverage of the Tehran 
protests. Twitter users were acting as media watchdogs; not only were they 
providing information, but they were also demanding more from the mainstream 
media.  
Global, especially American, news organizations looked at images coming out of 
Iran as proofs of the power of “new” media technologies to “democratize” 
authoritarian environments, and many observers have claimed that these media 
now play a crucial role in social movements and revolutions (Libresco, June 16, 
2009; Shirky). Such coverage reflects an ignorance of previous episodes of 
political contention when then “small” non-mainstream media played an important 
role. Indeed, “new” media are not newcomers to the Iranian political scene and 
social movement circles. The years leading up to the 1979 revolution bear 
witness to the fundamental role played by such media in galvanizing the 
revolutionary process. Newly-introduced electronic devices, particularly the 
transistorized audiotape machine, were of paramount importance in the 
communication of religious and political messages; messages that often found 
their source beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Ayatollah Khomeini, 
spiritual leader of the revolution, had been exiled in 1963. His sermons and 
pronouncements came in the form of audiotapes which were later transcribed 
and mimeographed or Xeroxed on a massive scale (Tehranian, 1980 p. 21). 
Messages entered the country in a “new media” form and diffused internally in 
more traditional and paper-form media. “Small media,” as wrote Sreberny-
Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994), who offer the most probing and systematic 
analysis of those events, contributed to a “big revolution.”  
Much like the migratory nature of Khomeini’s messages from his exile in 
Neauphle-le-Château into Iran, the Neda video travelled from Tehran to the world 
wide web. If Khomeini’s messages were auditory by nature, the messages 
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beaming out of Iran in 2009 were primarily audio-visual (videos and images) and 
textual (tweets). Where audiotapes were the carrying medium of sermons, small 
mobile devices stood out as the perfect medium for the transmission of live 
footage from the demonstrations in the absence of mainstream media coverage. 
This footage was subsequently re-transmitted via tweets on Twitter which often 
provided links to YouTube videos and Flickr images. Similar to the manner in 
which Khomeini’s messages were adapted from audiotapes into more traditional 
communication channels, Neda’s image migrated from mobile devices, into the 
web, and was eventually transformed into a poster held at  worldwide street 
demonstrations.  
  
5. Conclusion: Reconsidering hypermedia  
The two case-studies described in the preceding text raise several issues about 
the connection between hypermedia space and political agency, and beyond 
that, about the future of global communication studies. The judicious, activist use 
of hypermedia space contributed to a transformatio n of the field of contention in 
both Lebanon in 2005 and Iran in 2009. Hypermedia space’s importance resides 
in the ways in which it combines mobility, interactivity and visibility. We can now 
glimpse the contours of a theory of hypermedia in which mobile activists 
interactively activate inter-media configurations that connect media old and new, 
gaining visibility for their cause through a hypermedia space that is less 
controllable than social space and therefore potentially subversive of the 
prevalent mode of governance—something that was manifest in both Beirut and 
Tehran.  
A theory of hypermedia space at once foregrounds the importance of emerging 
media—YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc—while at the same time emphasizing 
that “old” media like television, the world wide web and newspapers are essential 
links in hypermedia space. “New” and “old” media are therefore locked in an 
inter-dependent, mutually re-enforcing, complementary relationship. In Beirut, 
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text-messaging and digital cameras served to channel crucial information that 
increased the visibility of the cause on television. Similarly, Neda’s story proves 
that whereas YouTube and Twitter are potentially subversive tools to be utilized 
by political activists, they do so only when integrated with “old” or traditional 
media. The movement of images among mobile phones, computer screens, and 
television screens had to link up to television to be widely diffused. Television as 
an institution therefore became as much of a target of both the “Independence 
Intifada” and the “Green Movement” as the scorned governments. In the case of 
Iran, the #CNNfail campaign is but an example of activists seeing television as 
an essential ally in their campaign. That the video of Neda had become a global 
sensation cannot be attributed to YouTube alone. Al-Jazeera, CNN, and BBC, to 
name a few, broadcast the video. Theirs is an essential role in the development 
of the story, especially in contexts where new media technologies are still lagging 
behind and television sets remain the most widely diffused medium. In Iran, out 
of a population of 66,429,284, there were 32,200,000 internet users as of 
September 2009, which means an internet penetration of 48.5% (Internet World 
Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com  ). Sysomos, a Toronto-based web 
analytics company researching social media says there are only about 8,600 
Twitter users whose profiles indicate they are from Iran (Schectman, June 17, 
2009). Furthermore, while much commentary portrayed Iranian youth and the 
internet as harbingers of democracy, a survey poll conducted by The Washington 
Post showed that “only a third of Iranians even have access to the Internet, while 
18-to-24-year-olds comprised the strongest voting bloc for Ahmadinejad of all 
age groups” (Ballen and Doherty, June 17, 2009). Blogger Maximillian Forte 
wittingly summarized the situation when he wrote: “So in this Twitter revolution, 
Twitter is not representative of Internet users, Internet use is not representative 
of a wider population, the youth are not representative of the youth, and the 
Iranians may not even be Iranian. Fantastic indeed, this power of ‘social media’” 
(June 17, 2009). 
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The future of global communication studies depends on research that 
systematically explores, explicate and theorize the ways in which a variety of 
“old” and “new” media connect to each other, rather than celebrating the rise of 
new media or lamenting the decline of old.  However, we should be cautious not 
to fetishize the technology, but to remain focused on the politically motivated 
people using it and the social and political contexts—national and global—of their 
action. It is here that the important issue of social agency comes to the fore. 
Hypermedia space is one of the sites of social agency, because as Bolter and 
Grusin argue, “[M]edia do have agency, but that agency … is constrained and 
hybrid … the agency of cultural change is located on the interaction of formal, 
material, and economic logics that slip into and out of the grasp of individuals and 
social groups.” (Bolter & Grusin, 1999, p. 78). To follow this general line of 
thinking while eschewing media determinism, we propose to think of hypermedia 
as a space in which agency can be grasped when individuals and communities 
activate information configurations through willful, activist action. In this sense, 
we propose moving away at once from theories like media dependency and 
imperialism that locate agency exclusively in the political economic structure of 
media technologies, and from cultural theories of active users that posits agency 
in interpretive decoding of media messages. What global communication studies 
requires to remain a dynamic field, we argue, are theoretically informed, 
empirically based studies that explore the social and political implications of 
hypermedia space in concrete contexts.  
In this regard, the connection between communicative practices and situations 
on the ground needs further exploration and theorizing. One way to begin doing 
that is to distinguish between information and mobilization. Iran’s “Twitter 
Revolution” facilitated the exchange of information across borders; but the extent 
to which it was effective in organizing demonstrations and mobilizing people to 
rally remains in doubt. Was Twitter as effective an internal communication within 
the movement as it was in externally promoting the movement’s aims? It could 
be argued that the “public” nature of such media and their high visibility make 
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them perfect for the mass diffusion of information while at the same time 
rendering them ineffective in organizing clandestine operations in volatile 
contexts. After all, it makes no sense for Iranian activists trying to escape 
government persecution to answer Twitter’s fundamental question “what are you 
doing?” by posting their next stop. Though the posting of information seems 
counter-intuitive in revolutions, there were many campaigns publicizing lists of 
so-called "proxy servers" that could help bypass some of the restrictions imposed 
by the government of certain IP addresses. Due to over extensive publicity, the 
value of such proxy servers was destroyed as the government obtained access 
to them and was therefore able to ban them.  
Hypermedia space provides an alternative to the rigidly controlled and monitored 
social space (Kraidy, 2006). True, Facebook profile pages show what one cannot 
see in Tehran’s public murals for instance; they recognize Neda as a national 
martyr which she was for many Iranians. Technology enabled such a process to 
take place, during which otherwise neglected actors have entered the opinion-
making game. It is by entering hypermedia space that Neda’s video has become 
a sensational media product enabling the expression of a counter-state rhetoric. 
But this street/Facebook dichotomy is a dangerous one as it reveals the 
existence of a double-reality: a physical and a virtual one. There is a risk that as 
long as the “ideal” state can be experienced in the virtual space (which is a reality 
in its own right), material reality will not undergo meaningful change. Though 
media alone do not produce revolutions, any revolution today cannot happen 
without the media, old and new. Paradoxically, however, the very nature of new 
media has eroded the notion of revolution. Producing or watching a video is not a 
political act in itself. And as long as people in front of their screens are under the 
illusion that they are making a contribution, a shared video is as far as a 
revolution would go. In some cases, the shift of social life– through texts, images, 
icons, and symbols—into hypermedia space can reflect political stagnation. In 
hindsight, both Lebanon’s 2005 “Independence Intifada” and Iran’s 2009 “Green 
Movement” have not led to enduring systemic political change. 
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Another issue related to understanding how communication practices relate to 
concrete material situation concerns issues of trust and authenticity. New social 
media makes it arduous, even impossible, to determine the identity of activists. 
Though this was not a major issue in Beirut’s Independence Intifada, it was 
manifest in the case of Iran, when many Twitter users who are not in Iran 
decided to change their time zone and set their location to Tehran in order to 
protect those who are tweeting locally from government prosecution and 
censorship. As a result, the number of local Iranian Twitter users and the sources 
of Iran-related tweets cannot be determined. As Foreign Policy magazine blogger 
Evgeny Morozov put it, “There is a huge Iranian Diaspora that […] is using social 
media even more actively than their peers back in Iran. So, if the person's name 
sounds Iranian, they have some content in Farsi on their blog, and are posting a 
lot about events in Tehran - how do we know if they are in Tehran or, say, Los 
Angeles?” (Morozov, June 17, 2009). Finally, issues of “noise” and 
“manipulation” must be considered. In chaotic environments like Beirut in 2005 
and Tehran in 2009 where foreign governments and intelligence agencies were 
involved, it is possible for external actors to reframe the movement and add their 
own interpretations and opinions to the events. What, then, constitutes 
“authentic” Lebanese or Iranian voices? 
Finally, global communication scholars need to focus on the extent to which 
widespread political contention—no matter how genuine, deeply felt, and heavily 
mediated—leads to sustained social and political change. In both cases, 
movements formed with telegenic demonstrators airing real grievances to gain 
sympathy and support from local and global actors. Both events under study in 
this essay have so far not led to permanent, institutional changes in the 
Lebanese and Iranian polities. The 1979 revolution in Iran holds an important 
lesson: the revolutionaries relied on audiotapes, but these were integrated into a 
network of 90,000 mosques, organized around 60,000 to 200,000 mullahs and 
linked to a university-based radical intelligentsia, with its underground and exile 
publications (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994; Tehranian, 1980, 
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p.18). For hypermedia chains to be effective, they must necessarily be integrated 
in pre-existing social networks and institutions to endow hypermedia space with 
trust, authenticity and ultimately popular acceptance. This confirms the 
importance of contextually sensitive, empirically based, theoretically guided 
studies if we are to understand the role of digital culture in global communication 
studies beyond utopian platitudes fetishizing new media as reliable agents of 
radical change on the one hand and dismissive knee-jerk reactions oblivious to 
qualitative changes to the global media environment on the other hand. 
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[1] According to the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), 42 
journalists were held in Iranian jails by July 30, 2009, most of them accused of 
“sending pictures to enemy media.” For a more detailed account of the 
detentions, visit http://cpj.org/2009/07/journalists -face-trial-in-iran-as-arrests-
continue.php  
 [2] After a long absence, #IranElection bounced back into Twitter’s trending 
topics at number 4 when rallies were taking place in Iran to commemorate the 
31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution (The Independent , February 11, 2010). 
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